According to the writings of Michael Doyle, the liberal democratic peace theory is an idea that liberal democratic states are much more likely to have peace with each other, and less likely to go to war[1]. In order to analyze the extent to which this is true, several aspects of liberal democracies must be examined: the public’s role in democratic states; the role of economic factors including interdependence; and the nature of powerful democratic states. By examining these aspects, one will be able to explore what the liberal democratic peace theory is, and whether its’ central premise is accurate.
Philosopher Immanuel Kant argues that ‘perpetual’ peace is most likely to be achieved under a republican constitution, because it is the public that experiences the hardships and immense consequences of war; thus they would most likely vote against war[2]. On the other hand, Kant argues that in non-republican constitutions “a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon,[3]” because the ruler is not the one that is required to make sacrifices. Modern theorists have applied this theory to democracy. One of the main definitions of democracy is ‘people’s rule’. This definition is applied in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, where he states “government: of the people, by the people, for the people.[4]” However, there has been much criticism of the democratic peace theory, specifically regarding the public’s role. Prior to the Iraq War, 54% of Americans favoured a U.S invasion of Iraq[5]. On the surface, it may seem like this decision was ‘democratic’. Yet, historian Weart contends that certain characteristics of democratic politicians are ignored: “lying, manipulation, and ruthlessness.[6]” The U.S Government manipulated public opinion by falsely accusing Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction; thus undermining the public’s role. Since liberal democracies have representative governments, it is possible that certain decisions taken by governments are against public opinion. For example, the Russian Provisional Government was determined to continue its’ participation in WWI, contrary to popular sentiment[7]. Thus, isn’t it possible to compare an elected government to a ruler in a non-republican constitution? Still, it is difficult to ignore the impact that public opinion can have on decision making, and the possibility that public opinion in democratic states has managed to maintain peace.
It is often argued by theorists, such as Havard Hegre, that democracy does reduce the likelihood of war, only if there is a developed economy[8]. In an assessment for the World Bank, Hegre concludes that economic development only reduces the likelihood of war in democratic countries[9]. This may challenge the democratic peace theory as it is not clear whether democracy is a consequence of a stable economy, or a cause of it. Also, Michael Mousseau determines that if a democratic country has low-levels of development, then the risk of war is not reduced[10]. Mousseau’s argument thus invalidates the democratic peace theory because the theory does not distinguish between the different economic conditions of democratic countries. Furthermore, Erich Weede contends that economic interdependence and trade, not democracy, lead to a reduced risk of war[11]. This is because such interdependence leads to economic interest groups being formed, and governments would not want to disrupt such interests[12]. Many liberals, such as Richard Rosecrance, argue that WWII would not have occurred had all the states been democratic, because economic interdependence is more likely to be present between democracies[13]. However, realists tend to argue that interdependence may increase the risk of war because of the changing expectations of future trade. Additionally, realists believe that countries that are dependent on others for vital goods have a greater incentive to go to war in order to maintain access to these goods[14]. Nevertheless, such arguments have been disputed, because realists tend to ignore the benefits of interdependence. Therefore, it is clear that democracy and economic factors play a great role in maintaining peace; however it is debateable whether or not economic interdependence is a cause of democracy.
Although democracies rarely enter into war with each other, there have been many cases where they have entered into war with non-democratic states. This challenges the idea that democracies tend to be more peaceful than non-democracies. Professor Joanne Gowa contends that “major powers are much more likely than are other states to become involved in armed disputes, including war.[15]” Since the end of WWII, there have been 27 wars involving powerful liberal democratic states: the USA, UK, France, India, and Israel. Therefore, it would be difficult to disregard Gowa’s contention. Furthermore, the acquirement of nuclear weapons is seen as the greatest threat to world peace. There are only nine states that have nuclear weapons: seven of which are democratic states[16]. Politician Gareth Evans states that “so long as any nuclear weapons remain…they are bound one day to be used[17].” Accordingly, the nuclear weapons developed by these democratic states undermine the whole democratic peace theory. Additionally, democratic states have commonly entered into wars with non-democratic states. For example, the Football War between El Salvador and Honduras occurred after violent clashes between fans during the 1970 FIFA World Cup[18]; interestingly, the war was initiated by the democratic state of El Salvador[19]. Although several theorists, such as R.J. Rummel, claim that democracy promotes non-violence[20], they tend to reclassify certain conflicts as exceptions, or claim that the conflicts did not occur between ‘real’ democracies[21]. However, the democratic peace theory does not state the definition of democracy; consequently, such reclassification is often criticized. The extent to which democracies are less likely to enter into war is therefore questionable, especially since several conflicts have been labelled as exceptions.
In conclusion, it would be difficult to wholly agree with the liberal democratic peace theory. At the same time, it would be erroneous to completely dismiss the theory. Kant believed that people are likely to vote against war as they are the ones that experience its’ hardships. However, the public opinion may be manipulated; thus undermining the public’s role in liberal democracies. Moreover, liberals often argue that economic interdependence, which leads to a reduced risk of war, is a result of democracy. However, the reduced risk of war does not occur in democracies with low economic development. Finally, there have been several conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, which liberals tend to ignore as exceptions. Realists claim that major powers, the majority of which are democratic, are more likely to enter into war than non-major powers. Overall, the extent to which democracies are less likely to enter into war is highly questionable; consequently, it is difficult to agree with the liberal democratic peace theory.
[1] Michael W. Doyle, "Philosophy & Public Affairs," Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205.
[2] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (thesis, 1795), Section II, accessed August 25, 2011, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Abraham Lincoln, "Abraham Lincoln: The Gettysburg Address," InfoUSA: U.S. Department of State, section goes here, accessed August 25, 2011, http://infousa.state.gov/government/overview/gettysburg.html.
[5] Richard Benedetto, "Poll: Most Back War, but Want U.N. Support," USA Today, March 17, 2003, section goes here, accessed August 26, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-16-poll-iraq_x.htm.
[6] Spencer R. Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 84..
[7] Norman Lowe, "Russia and the Revolutions," in Mastering Modern World History, 4th ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 345.
[8] Håvard Hegre, Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict, thesis, The World Bank, 2003 (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo), 3.
[9] Håvard Hegre, Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict, thesis, The World Bank, 2003 (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo), 35-36.
[10] Michael Mousseau, Comparing New Theory with Prior Beliefs: Market Civilization and the Democratic Peace, thesis, Peace Science Society (International), 2003 (Istanbul: Koç University, 2003), 8-9.
[11] Erich Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization 9, no. 2 (2004): 172, accessed August 27, 2011, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf.
[12] Erich Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization 9, no. 2 (2004): 170, accessed August 27, 2011, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf.
[13] Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996), accessed August 27, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/pss/2539041.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Joanne S. Gowa, "Peace," in Ballots and Bullets: the Exclusive Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 35.
[16] "List of States with Nuclear Weapons," Wikipedia, Statistics, accessed August 25, 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons.
[17] Gareth Evans, "Nuclear Weapons As A Threat To Global Peace" (speech, UNI Global Union 3rd World Conference, Nagasaki, November 11, 2010), November 9, 2010, accessed August 26, 2011, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech430.html.
[18] "Soccer War 1969," OnWar.com - Wars, Military History, International Relations, section goes here, accessed August 26, 2011, http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/sierra/soccer1969.htm.
[19] Ibid.
[20] R. J. Rummel, "Why Does Power Kill?," in Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 241.
[21] Joanne S. Gowa, "Peace," in Ballots and Bullets: the Exclusive Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 52.
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