Whether powerful states have a responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises has been regularly debated. For the purpose of this post, as defined by Holzgrefe, humanitarian intervention is the use of military power to end widespread violations of human rights[1], and is best carried out by powerful states that are able to exert their military, political, and economic influence either regionally or globally. In a responsibility to intervene exists, several arguments will be examined: the presence of the responsibility to intervene irrespective of national self-interest; whether principles of sovereignty alleviate this responsibility; and the importance of consensus regarding human rights. By examining these aspects, one will be able to conclude the extent to which powerful states have a responsibility to intervene.
Realists have often argued that powerful states do not have the responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises, unless it would benefit their national self-interest. Nicholas Wheeler writes that the pursuit of national self-interest results in the selective application of human rights principles[2]. A regularly used example is the Rwandan genocide: no powerful states intervened because no economic, political, or strategic interests existed[3]. However, constructivists stress that the emergence of a humanitarian intervention norm could cause states to consistently intervene in humanitarian crises, regardless of their national self-interest: this norm would imply that it is expected of powerful states to intervene[4]. It has been claimed that the recent intervention in Libya is a ‘watershed’ for this norm, where states intervened in order to stop the systematic killing of civilians by the Gadhafi government[5]. At the same time, no intervention has occurred in Syria, where the government is committing similar atrocities. However, Gareth Evans writes that military interventions have in many cases not occurred due to the lack of reasonable prospects that such intervention would not cause further harm[6]. It is important to remember that although military intervention has been highly selective, other forms of intervention (such as economic sanctions and diplomatic discourse) have been consistently implemented by powerful states, regardless of their national self-interest. For example, many powerful states adopted economic sanctions against the Apartheid government of South Africa, regardless of the fact that these sanctions worked against their economic interests. It can therefore be established that there has been a developing tendency where states do have the responsibility to intervene, regardless of their national self-interest.
It has often been argued that powerful states do not have the responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises due to the principles of sovereignty. Sovereignty, the supreme authority within a given territory[7], has been central to international society since the Peace of Westphalia[8], and has often been used as a shield against humanitarian intervention. According to pluralist theory, humanitarian intervention would “damage international stability[9]” as it sets precedence for further intervention in a state’s internal affairs. However, it has been argued that there has been an emerging norm, where extreme violations of human rights provide the international community with a moral obligation to intervene. Thomas Farer argues that sovereignty is not an “absolute right[10]” and should be subject to “minimum standards of decency[11].” This idea that sovereignty entails a responsibility towards human rights forms the principal framework of a doctrine entitled “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). R2P states that if a state pursues extreme violence against its citizens, then it is the responsibility of capable international actors to intervene[12]. Michael Doyle writes that the recent intervention in Libya on the principles of R2P portrays a rise in the norm of humanitarian intervention in the cases of extreme violations of human rights, despite national sovereignty[13]. Therefore, it is clear “the extent to which a state enjoys the full benefits of sovereignty is a condition of its behavior[14]:” if that behavior violates human rights, then it is the responsibility of powerful states to intervene.
Pluralists have often claimed that humanitarian intervention is not justified, because the international community has been unable to reach consensus regarding global principles of human rights. This is evidenced by numerous situations where powerful states have been inconsistent and ineffective in dealing with humanitarian crises due to the failure to reach consensus[15].On the other hand, Amy Dowell contends that humanitarian intervention is justified, irrespective of sufficient consensus, because there is established “global standards of justice and human rights that necessitate[16]” intervention by international actors in humanitarian crises. These global standards have been recognized in numerous international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Additionally, recent arguments have shown that there is an emerging international norm which encourages humanitarian intervention even if states are unable to reach consensus. Yet, pluralists claim that humanitarian intervention that overlooks consensus could damage international order[17]. Conversely, the ICISS states that the damage to international order is greater “if human beings are slaughtered while the UN Security Council stands by[18].” What this seeks to demonstrate is that the lack of UNSC consensus should not relieve the responsibility of powerful states to intervene in humanitarian crises. An example of this can be seen where NATO (without UN approval) intervened in Kosovo. Still, the ICISS warns that the UN should not be undermined as it is central to the stability of international law and ideals[19]. Overall, it is evident that humanitarian intervention is limited by consensus: this makes it the responsibility of powerful states, specifically members of the UNSC, “to find common ground …and act in the defense of our common humanity[20].”
It is evident that there is an emerging international norm that powerful states have the responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises. Although realists have argued that national self-interest is the central for humanitarian intervention, it is clear that there is an emerging norm (as evidenced by the recent Libyan intervention) where it is the responsibility of powerful states to intervene, regardless of national self-interest. Moreover the pluralist contention that humanitarian intervention violates sovereignty and could thus damage international stability was disregarded due to an emergence of a norm (as seen by the R2P) which establishes that powerful states do have the responsibility to intervene if a state is committing mass-abuse of human rights. Finally, the lack of international consensus regarding numerous crises where powerful states have failed to intervene supports the pluralist contention that powerful states should not intervene; but this does not alleviate the responsibility of powerful states to reach a consensus and act against humanitarian crises. Overall, to a great extent, powerful states do have a responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises.
[1] J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, "Part 1:The Context For Humanitarian Intervention," in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pg. 18.
[2] Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pg. 209.
[3] Amy Dowell, "The International Community and Intervention in Cases of Genocide,"University of Leeds Student Journal: pg. 10, accessed November 5, 2011, http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/amy-dowell-summer-09.pdf.
[4] Ibid, p.15
[5] Jayshree Bajoria, "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention," Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2011, accessed November 4, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524.
[6] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, Ont.: International Development Research Centre, 2001), pg. XII.
[7] Alain De Benoist, "What Is Sovereignty?," , accessed November 5, 2011, http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/what_is_sovereignty.pdf.
[8] Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era," Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): pg. 138, accessed November 4, 2011, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1898/weiss.pdf.
[9] Amy Dowell, "The International Community and Intervention in Cases of Genocide,"University of Leeds Student Journal: pg. 6, accessed November 5, 2011, http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/amy-dowell-summer-09.pdf.
[10] T. J. Farer, "Roundtable: Humanitarian Intervention After 9/11," International Relations 19, no. 2 (June 01, 2005): pg. 212, doi:10.1177/0047117805052814.
[11] Ibid, p.213
[12] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, Ont.: International Development Research Centre, 2001), pg. XII.
[13] Michael W. Doyle, "The Folly of Protection," Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2011, accessed November 5, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ARTICLES/67666/michael-w-doyle/the-folly-of-protection?page=show.
[14] Lee Feinstein, Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities(New York, NY.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), pg. 5.
[15] High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Chang, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, report (New York, NY.: United Nations, 2004), pg. 4.
[16] Amy Dowell, "The International Community and Intervention in Cases of Genocide,"University of Leeds Student Journal: 6, accessed November 5, 2011, http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/amy-dowell-summer-09.pdf.
[17] Ibid, p.7
[18] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, Ont.: International Development Research Centre, 2001), pg. 55.
[19] David Chandler, "The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’,"Peace Operations and Global Order: pg. 67, accessed November 6, 2011, http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/DavidChandlerTheResponsibilitytoProtect.ImposingtheLiberalPeace.pdf.
[20] Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," The United Nations, September 18, 1999, accessed November 4, 2011, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/articleFull.asp?TID=33&Type=Article.
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